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I. ABSTRACT 
Participants in the NFL gambling market can largely be divided into two distinct groups: 
informed bettors (“Sharps”) and uninformed bettors (“Squares”). Empirical and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that the dynamic between Sharp and Square bettors is very similar to 
that between institutional and retail investors. Professionals tend to be far better informed 
and utilize rational betting/investing strategies while individuals exhibit biases which 
perpetuate irrational strategies and therefore pricing inefficiencies. This study finds that 
uninformed participants in financial markets and the NFL betting market do share similar 
biases, and that these biases can be exploited by informed participants to generate 
positive excess returns. The ability of Sharp bettors to generate excess returns, much like 
professional investors, is well covered in academic research. This study adds to the 
existing literature by analyzing whether “Follower” bettors can achieve statistically 
significant excess returns and higher than expected winning percentages by identifying 
reverse line movements and imitating the bets of Sharp gamblers. 
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III. MOTIVATION 
 George Soros is famous for his theory of reflexivity, which has served as the 
foundation for his legendary investing strategy for more than three decades. He believes 
that market participants are inherently biased, which creates pricing inefficiencies that 
can be taken advantage of by the unbiased and informed investor (Soros 88). Investing 
strategies based upon the exploitation of inherent investor biases have been the subject of 
much debate in the academic circle due to their stark contrast to the efficient market 
hypothesis. This hypothesis is commonly referred to as the “noise trader” theory. 
The noise trader theory posits that irrational investors are making decisions based 
upon uninformed “pseudosignals” which creates an opportunity for rational traders to 
arbitrage the pricing inefficiency. Generally speaking, the bulk of uninformed market 
participants are individual investors while institutional investors comprise their informed 
counterparts (Lee et al. 1990). 
Central to the noise trader theory is the concept that uninformed investors trade 
based upon sentiment rather than prudent information. In order to test whether individual 
investors trade based upon sentiment, academics commonly study closed-end mutual 
funds. Such funds provide an excellent testing ground as they tend to be held primarily by 
individuals (Lee et al. 1990). The closed end structure of these funds allows academics to 
study the premium or discount at which these funds trade relative to their underlying net 
asset value. The theory is that fluctuations in the level of premium or discount indicate 
irrational buying or selling pressure from individual investors (Lee et al. 1991). Rational 
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investors arbitrage away these pricing inefficiencies until costs such as commissions 
eliminate the remaining profit opportunity (Pontiff 1996). 
 Two specific biases which academic studies have identified in individual 
investors include overreaction to recent information regarding a security and the tendency 
to buy “attention-grabbing” stocks. The overreaction theory purports that individual 
investors value recent information too highly and drive stocks above or below their 
intrinsic value. In support of this, Bondt and Thaler (1985) found that portfolios 
comprised of stocks in the bottom decile of performance tend to outperform their winning 
counterparts over the next three years. A similar study by Chopra et al. (1992) also found 
that this contrarian investing strategy can generate statistically significantly positive 
returns for informed investors. 
 The second bias which irrational investors exhibit is a preference to purchase 
stocks which are highly visible. Barber and Odean (2007) found that “individual 
investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, e.g., stocks in the news, stocks 
experiencing high abnormal trading volume, and stocks with extreme one-day returns.” 
The study does not investigate the viability of a contrarian strategy that identifies and 
sells “attention-grabbing” stocks, but does find the purchase of such securities by 
individual investors to be irrational and unprofitable. This result is profound as it could 
indicate greater short-term pricing inefficiency in stocks that receive abnormally high 
attention. 
 Institutional investors do not exhibit the same sentiment and biases that most 
individual investors do. Barber and Odean contrast their findings regarding individual 
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investors with evidence that professional investors “are likely to employ explicit purchase 
criteria—perhaps implemented with computer algorithms—that circumvent attention-
driven buying.” Feng and Seaholes (2005) reached a similar conclusion that experienced 
investors such as institutions tend to be less biased. The effect of institutional investors 
rationality is that stocks with greater institutional ownership are more efficiently priced 
(Boehmer and Kelley 2009). 
  Institutional investors’ superior access to information, combined with their 
awareness of individual investor bias, allows them to achieve highly profitable trading 
strategies (Nofsinger and Sias 1999). A specific example of this is the ability of 
institutions to predict earnings breaks at least one quarter in advance of the break quarter. 
Evidence suggests that this is made possible by “obtaining information regarding the 
impending break from private communications with management” (Ke and Petroni 
2004). Such communications provide a clear advantage over individual investors. 
 All of these studies indicate that institutional investors are superior to individual 
investors in their lack of bias as well as greater access to information. The question then 
becomes, however, whether non-institutional investors who are aware of these inherent 
discrepancies, can mimic the investing strategies of institutions and generate positive 
excess returns. While most strategies employed by large institutions are too complex or 
require too much capital to be replicated by individual investors, there are instances in 
which a “copycat” strategy appears to be profitable. One example of this is individual 
investors who attempt to imitate the holdings of Warren Buffett’s legendary Berkshire 
Hathaway. Because Berkshire’s holdings records are released on a monthly basis, it is not 
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difficult to create a portfolio comprised of their public investments. Martin and 
Puthenpurackal (2008) found that such a strategy can yield statistically significant excess 
returns. 
Greater access to information and lack of bias have been shown to render 
institutional investors superior at generating returns compared to individual investors in 
the financial markets. In this paper, I will study whether uniformed participants in a 
different market—the NFL gambling market—exhibit similar biases and whether they 
can also be exploited by their informed counterparts. Furthermore, I will test whether 
individuals who are aware of retail gambler biases and the superior information possessed 
by professional gamblers can utilize reverse line movements to mimic bets placed by 
professionals and generate excess returns. 
 
IV. IMPORTANCE AND STRUCTURE OF THE NFL GAMBLING MARKET 
One must look no further than the record $119 million wagered in Nevada casinos 
on the 2014 Super Bowl to understand the magnitude of sports gambling in the United 
States. The Nevada Gaming Control Board reports that legal gambling action on the 
Super Bowl has increased every year over the past five seasons, and some experts 
estimate that as little as 1 percent of bets placed on the big game are done so legally 
(NGCB 2014) (Hairopoulos 2011). The rest are wagered anywhere from black market 
betting rings to office pools, and when it’s all said and done roughly half of all 
Americans have a stake in the game (Hairopoulos 2011). 
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These tremendous figures are not limited to the Super Bowl. According to 
revenue estimates from the Nevada Gaming Control board, approximately $3 billion was 
wagered on sports in Nevada in 2013 with a similarly huge percentage likely being 
gambled illegally (NGCB 2014).1 Similar to financial markets, participants in the NFL 
betting market range from casual sports fans basing their picks on intuition and very 
limited research, to professional betting syndicates with millions of dollars and complex 
computer prediction systems at their disposal. Conventional wisdom dictates that 
professional gamblers, commonly referred to as “Sharps,” enjoy a significant 
informational advantage over retail gamblers. Much like individual investors, retail 
gamblers (otherwise known as “Squares”), are thought to be highly biased in their betting 
decisions which creates inefficiencies for Sharps and sports books to exploit (Rodney and 
Weinbach 2010). 
Furthermore, academic studies have found that by exploiting these biases, Sharps 
are able to achieve positive excess returns (Miller and Rapach 2013). Given these 
findings, it is intuitive that individuals mimicking Sharp bettors could also achieve 
significant profits. While the strategies of most Sharps are closely guarded secrets, some 
bettors believe that it is possible to ascertain where the “smart money” is being wagered 
by observing how the spread on the game changes over time. 
The specific strategy which I will explore in this paper uses reverse line 
movements to identify teams that Sharps are betting on. I will test whether non-Sharps, 
who I will refer to as “Followers,” can then win more than the expected 50 percent of 
1 Calculated based on $136 million in net revenue and standard 4.5% commission rate on total wagers 
placed 
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wagers and earn statistically significant positive returns by betting on the same side as the 
professionals. While some bettors have sworn by this strategy for years, to my knowledge 
it has not yet been studied in academic literature. I will explain more about the theory 
behind and execution of the reverse line movement strategy in section IV of this paper. 
My findings provide evidence that bettors using variations of the reverse line 
movement strategy are able to achieve win rates that are statistically significantly higher 
than the expected 50 percent level and that they can earn positive excess returns, 
especially in the absence of commission costs. 
These results, along with existing research on NFL betting, indicate that the 
market is governed by similar biases to those that exist in financial markets. Square 
bettors appear to have similar biases to those observed in individual investors, while 
Sharp bettors take advantage of these biases through comparable contrarian strategies to 
those used by institutional investors. 
 
V. UNDERSTANDING THE POINT SPREAD 
 The sports gambling industry was revolutionized in the 1940s when legendary 
sports handicapper Charles K. McNeil invented the point spread method of book making 
(Boyle 1986). Book makers had previously offered only odds that a team would win 
outright (e.g. 4-to-1 that Green Bay would beat Chicago) which is the same way that 
baseball gambling works today. Under McNeil’s system, however, bettors would wager 
on how many points a team would win or lose by. For example, the Chicago Bears would 
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be offered at -10 (10 point favorites) over the Green Bay Packers. Bettors taking Chicago 
would need the Bears to win by more than 10 points while bettors wagering on Green 
Bay would need the Packers to lose by less than 10 points or win outright. A 10 point 
Chicago victory would result in a “push” in which both sides of the wager would have 
their money returned in its entirety. The 10 points by which the Bears are favored is 
referred to as the “spread” or “betting line” and the winning side of a spread bet is said to 
have “won against the spread” or “covered the spread.” The point spread system which 
McNeil introduced remains the most popular method of gambling on football and 
basketball games of all levels and is often credited as a primary reason for the explosive 
growth of the sports betting markets. 
 Empirical evidence shows that spreads offered by sports books are very accurate 
predictors of actual game outcomes and that it is very difficult to achieve win rates 
greater than the expected 50 percent level (Sauer et al. 1988). Compounding this, bettors 
must contend with the commission which sports books charge for their services. Also 
known as the “vigorish,” “vig,” or “juice,” sports books typically follow the standard 10-
for-11 payout structure. This means that the book collects the entirety of all losing bets 
while only paying out $10 for every $11 wagered on the winning side. This implies a 
juice of 4.55% on the total amount bet. In theory, if the book follows this standard and 
consistently balances their book (an equal amount of money being bet on the favorite and 
the underdog), they will earn a risk-free return of 4.55% on all money wagered. 
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VI. THEORY 
A key attribute of the point spread is that sports books have the ability to change it 
over time as more information becomes available and bettor preferences become 
apparent. The books will typically post an “opening line” on Monday or Tuesday of 
every week for the NFL games played on the following weekend. Throughout the week, 
however, they will change the line based on information such as injury reports and bettor 
action. 
This gives the books a certain degree of control over how much action both sides 
of a bet receive. If more money is being placed on Chicago at -10 than the sports book 
wants, they can raise the line to -10.5 or -11 in order to make a bet on Green Bay more 
attractive. Changes in the line throughout the course of the week are quite common. The 
data set used in this paper shows that the line changed from the open to the close in 76% 
of games played in the NFL since 2003. Similar frequencies of line changes have been 
documented in the NBA (Gander, Dare, et al. 1998). Line changes over the course of the 
week are documented by sports books and this information is easily accessible to bettors 
on numerous websites such as VegasInsider.com. 
Also documented on these websites is the percent of bets being placed on both 
teams in a given matchup (but not the total dollars bet). Coupling this with the line 
movements and the assumption that sports books want to balance the notional amount bet 
on each side of the matchup is quite informative. Assuming that books are balanced and 
that every bet placed is of equal dollar value, logic would dictate that if more than 50 
percent of bets are being placed on a given team, the book would move the line against 
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them (bigger favorite or smaller underdog) in order to encourage more action on the other 
side. To again use the example of Chicago versus Green Bay, this would mean that if 70 
percent of bets are being placed on the Bears at -10, then we would expect the book to 
make them -10.5 or -11 point favorites. The Packers then become increasingly attractive 
at +10.5 or +11 point underdogs and the book should approach a relative level of parity 
on both sides. The line will in theory move until it is at the market clearing level. 
Empirical evidence, however, shows that lines will sometimes not move in this 
expected manner. Rather, the line will move to Chicago -9.5 or -9, which is in complete 
contrast to our above example. Such a change in the spread is referred to as a “reverse 
line movement” and indicates that our assumption of balanced books, equal sized bets, or 
both are invalid. The theory surrounding these line movements is that they are caused by 
Sharps betting heavily on one side of the line (the Packers in this example). If one 
operates under the assumption of balanced sports books, the occurrence of reverse line 
movements means that Sharps are placing much larger bets than Squares. 
On the other hand, if one assumes that all bets are of equal dollar amount, then 
reverse line movements indicate that the books value the insight bettors taking the 
Packers significantly more than that of those betting on the Bears. This means that sports 
books are taking on a risk position that stands to profit if the Packers cover the spread and 
to lose if the Bears do so. In fact, sports books taking proprietary positions on games is 
well documented in academic research (Humphreys 2011) (Levitt 2004). 
Ultimately, logic as well as anecdotal evidence suggest that because Sharps are 
more informed, the bets they place are larger in size and sports books highly value their 
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insight. Perhaps the clearest example of a prolific sports gambler whose bets can single 
handedly move sports lines is that of Billy Walters. Walters is a legendary sports 
handicapper who has amassed an estimated $200 million fortune, largely from his 
football and basketball betting operations. He began his career in sports gambling as an 
illegal book maker in Kentucky and eventually moved to Las Vegas in the 1980s where 
he became part of one of the first computer betting syndicates (Berzon 2014). Today he is 
considered to be one of the most notorious sports gamblers of all time and is described by 
his peers as “brilliant,” “respected,” and “feared”. 
Walters uses a team of analysts to scour for information on injuries, weather, and 
statistics which he inputs into an advanced computer system in order to gain an edge over 
the sports books and the betting public. His systems generate a predicted spread for each 
game, and the larger the discrepancy between Walters’ predictions and the casino sports 
lines, the more he will bet. On any given Sunday during the NFL season, Walters will 
have an average of $2 million at risk—clearly orders of magnitude more than virtually 
any retail gambler. On the 2010 Super Bowl alone, he famously won $3.5 million. His 
track record speaks for itself as he claims to have never had a losing year in a career that 
spans more than three decades (CBS News 2011). This unprecedented level of success 
has certainly drawn the attention of sports books over the years. In a rare 60 Minutes 
piece documenting Walters’ career, CEO of CG Technology Lee Amaitis was asked if 
Walters has the ability to move betting lines. CG Technology manages multiple sports 
books across Las Vegas. Amaitis responded, “of course he does…he’s Billy Walters…of 
course he has the ability to move our lines.” Amaitis went on to say that it is an 
advantage to know what Walters is thinking (CBS News 2011). 
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An interesting comparison to be made is to that of George Soros famously 
speculating on the British pound sterling in 1992. Recognizing that the UK currency had 
entered into the Exchange Rate Mechanism at too high of a rate, Soros sold short $10 
billion in pound sterling. The downward pressure which this exerted on the pound 
sterling forced the Bank of England to secede from the ERM and devalue the currency. 
Much like Walters, Soros recognized an artificially inflated asset and utilized his brute 
force as an investing behemoth to correct the valuation and profit from the inefficiency. 
By deflating the pound sterling, Soros earned an estimated $1 billion and the moniker of 
“the man who broke the Bank of England” (Litterick 2002). 
While it is true that Billy Walters, much like George Soros, is the Sharpest in his 
field, he serves as proof of both the influence which Sharp gamblers have over betting 
lines and the large size of bets which Sharps are consistently placing. This strongly 
supports the theory that reverse line movements can indicate which side the smart money 
is flowing to. Bettors privy to this phenomenon have believed for years that they could 
gain an advantage by following the lead of line-moving Sharps. Due to lack of historical 
data on public betting percentages, however, the effectiveness of such a strategy has yet 
to be studied by academics. 
Much like in financial markets, the advantage of professional gamblers is 
enhanced by noise created by retail gamblers. This noise skews lines in the direction of 
Square bias. A relatively well know example is that Squares tend to be biased towards 
favorites (Levitt 2004). In the data set used in this paper, approximately 80% of bets 
placed from 2003-2014 were on the favored team. Humphreys (2011) reached a similar 
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result. Knowing this, it stands to reason that an unbiased bettor could bet on the underdog 
at an inflated line and achieve positive returns (at least before commissions are 
considered). Indeed, academic studies have shown that variations of the underdog 
strategy can be profitable (Wever and Aadland 2011). 
Biases such as this create profit opportunities for Sharps as well as the sports 
books themselves. As stated earlier, it is not uncommon for sports books to take positions 
on games rather than balance their books. If they believe that Square bettors will be 
biased toward a particular team, the book has the ability to set the spread at a level which 
is different from the efficient level. Humphreys (2011) found that “sports books 
consistently take positions on games, and that these positions are mostly on the 
underdog” (64). To use the Super Bowl as an example, in 2014 Las Vegas casinos earned 
a return of 16.5% by taking a proprietary position on the underdog Seattle Seahawks. 
This return is significantly more than the 4.6% expected under the balanced book 
assumption (NGCB 2014). Because of their bias, squares will still buy the line even 
though the odds are stacked in favor of the book. Gandar et al. (1998) used evidence from 
the NBA betting market to show that sports books base their opening spreads not just on 
their predicted outcome for the game, but also on their “perception of the betting 
market’s evaluation of these outcomes” (387). 
 Much like the dynamic witnessed in closed-end funds, informed bettors tend to 
arbitrage away the inefficiencies created by the biased Square bettors until costs of 
arbitrage such as commissions eliminate the potential for further profit (Lee et al. 1990). 
Reverse line movements are the manifestation of this arbitrage activity. Lee et al. further 
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found that closed-end funds tend to be issued at premiums to their net asset values, and 
then revert to a discount within several months of the issue due to arbitrage. They 
attribute this phenomenon to overoptimistic investor sentiment, which is often caused by 
famous portfolio managers running the funds or the promise of innovative investment 
strategies. In a later paper, Lee et al. (1991) stated these findings more bluntly by alleging 
that “like casinos and snake oil, closed-end funds are a device by which smart 
entrepreneurs take advantage of a less sophisticated public” (84). 
 
VII. DATA 
To perform my analysis of the profitability of gambling strategies based on 
reverse line movements, I used a sample of NFL betting data from SportsInsights.com. 
The data set spans 2,967 games from 2003-2014 and includes information such as 
opening lines, closing lines, and recent performance of both teams in every matchup. 
These data points are not necessarily uncommon, but the unique aspect of this data set is 
that it also includes the public betting percentages for each matchup, therefore making it 
possible to identify reverse line movements. Sports Insights compiled the information 
from four highly reputable online sports books: Pinnacle, 5Dimes, BetUS, and GT Bets. 
To analyze whether Followers can profit from identifying reverse line movements 
and taking the same side as Sharp bettors, I tested both winning percentage and expected 
return. I chose to test three specific strategies, all of which were predicated upon reverse 
line movements. I began with a strategy of simply betting on all games that experienced 
reverse line movements. In this strategy, Followers bet on teams that are receiving less 
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than 40 percent of the total bets placed, but have had the spread move against them 
(became bigger favorites or smaller underdogs). 
Additionally, I tested two variations of the reverse line movement strategy which 
fit the aforementioned criteria and also utilized one additional filter when selecting teams 
to bet on. The first of these strategies focused exclusively on games played between two 
opponents in the same Conference that also experienced a reverse line movement. The 
purpose of only betting on In-Conference games is that they tend to attract more action 
from retail gamblers. For context, the NFL is divided evenly into two Conferences: the 
American Football Conference (AFC) and the National Football Conference (NFC). 
Because playoff berths are determined separately within the AFC and NFC, games 
between conference opponents tend to have more playoff implications and therefore 
receive more attention from retail gamblers. The theory underlying this strategy is 
directly related to the findings of individual investor bias toward “attention-grabbing” 
stocks. 
To test whether this theory held true in my data set, I utilized a filter available on 
Sports Insights which tracks number of bets on every game relative to the average bets 
per game on that day. Of games that received higher than average betting action since 
2003, 76 percent of those games were played between conference opponents. Because 
total number of bets placed on games relative to the day’s average is a retrospective 
measure, it cannot be used for as part of a real-time betting strategy. With such a high 
percentage of these games being In-Conference matchups, however, betting on In-
Conference games serves as a reasonable proxy. With increased participation from retail 
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gamblers, the effect of their biases should be amplified and therefore inefficiencies 
increased. A 2004 study of NFL gambling by Levitt supports this theory as he found that 
“the dispersion of the fraction of wagers placed on the preferred team is actually greater 
in the games with more total bets” (231). 
The final strategy which I tested was betting on teams that have performed very 
poorly in the two weeks prior to a game where a reverse line movement occurred, with 
poor performance being defined as losing by at least 10 points against the spread. This 
strategy takes advantage of Square bias against the poor performer by betting on the 
artificially inflated line (Gray and Gray 1997) (Sinkey and Logan 2012). The inspiration 
for this strategy came from the overreaction theory in financial markets which causes 
contrarian portfolios of prior losers to generate excess returns. 
I tested both the observed win percentage and excess returns of each of these 
strategies for statistical significance. For win percentage, I used Pearson’s Chi-Square to 
determine whether the strategies achieved win percentages greater than the expected 50 
percent level in this sample. An obvious question to be raised here is whether the 
expected win percentage should actually be 50 percent given the possibility of “pushes.” 
Because it is not possible to attain a theoretical value for the expected frequency of 
pushing (which would be required for the Chi-Square test), I excluded games that 
resulted in a push for this test. Once pushes have been omitted, the expected win 
percentage is necessarily 50 percent. Additionally, I tested the consistency of each 
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strategy by breaking the sample up into two periods of 2003-2008 and 2009-2014 and 
found the z-score for the difference in winning percentages within the two sub-periods.2 
To test the significance of the excess returns generated by each strategy I 
performed a two-tail t-test of the average return per bet to test whether it was different 
from the expected 0 percent level. I included games that resulted in a push because a 
theoretical push percentage is not necessary for this test. Additionally, I calculated the t-
statistic associated with the expected return per bet both before and after accounting for 
the juice in order to assess the effect of sports book commissions on otherwise potentially 
winning strategies. Also of note is that the actual payouts of winning bets in this sample 
are higher on average than the 10-for-11 rule would dictate. This is because the payout 
data came from Pinnacle, which is a “reduced juice” sports book. I tested the significance 
of the returns under the reduced juice payout structure as well. The equation for 
calculating the expected return is as follows3: 
𝑟𝑒 = (𝑟𝑤 × 𝑝𝑤) + (𝑟𝑙 × 𝑝𝑙) 
Finally, I calculated the realized annual in-sample return of each strategy using 
the Kelly Criterion for optimal bet size .4 For all of the strategies studied, I assumed that 
the Followers were placing their bets on the closing line. 
2 𝑧 = (?̅?1−?̅?2)
�?̅?(1−?̅?)� 1𝑛1+ 1𝑛1� 
3 rw and rl are the payouts of winning and losing bets, respectively; pw and pl are the probability of winning 
and losing, respectively 
4 The Kelly betting criterion is a formula which gamblers use to determine their optimal bet size. It is most 
commonly used in Blackjack gambling, but is applicable in this situation as well. In these tests I used a 
shrinkage factor of 0.5 in order to account for parameter uncertainty, as suggested by Baker and McHale 
(2013). 
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VIII. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Standard Reverse Line Movement Strategy: 
 
 This strategy produced a winning percentage (omitting pushes) of 53.1% over the 
12 season sample period. This winning percentage was not significant at the 10 percent 
level using Pearson’s Chi-Square test. Once pushes were included the winning percentage 
fell to 52.1% and the t-statistic of 1.58 approached significance at the 10 percent level 
before juice was accounted for. 
 Unsurprisingly, the inclusion of sports book juice had a hugely negative impact 
on the profitability of the betting strategy. The expected return per bet falls from 6.1% 
without juice to just 1.4% under the standard 4.6% juice assumption. Under the reduced 
juice structure, the returns are increased to 3.4%, but are still relatively far from statistical 
significance. A bettor utilizing this strategy over the past 12 NFL seasons using a reduced 
juice sports book would have achieved an annual return on investment of 7.9%. 
 If the sample is broken up into six year sub-periods, the winning percentage of the 
strategy does not differ across them. This indicates persistence of the strategy over time. 
The win percentages in the two sub-periods and z-score of the difference is as follows: 
Pearson Chi-Square Return Significance Return Significance Return Significance
(No Juice) (Standard Juice) (Reduced Juice)
Sample Win % 53.1% Sample Win % 52.1% Sample Win % 52.1% Sample Win % 52.1%
Expected Win % 50.0% Sample Push % 1.8% Sample Push % 1.8% Sample Push % 1.8%
Observations 642 Sample Lose % 46.0% Sample Lose % 46.0% Sample Lose % 46.0%
Observed Frequency 341 Winner Payout 1.00 Winner Payout 0.91 Winner Payout 0.95
Expected Frequency 321 Push Payout 0.00 Push Payout 0.00 Push Payout 0.00
Loser Payout -1.00 Loser Payout -1.00 Loser Payout -1.00
Expected Return 6.1% Expected Return 1.38% Expected Return 3.4%
Standard Deviation 99.0% Standard Deviation 94.5% Standard Deviation 96.5%
Observations 654 Observations 654 Observations 654
Standard Error 3.9% Standard Error 3.7% Standard Error 3.8%
Chi-Square 1.246 T Stat 1.580 T Stat 0.373 T Stat 0.902
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  The remaining two strategies were intended to boost returns by isolating 
situations in which pricing inefficiencies created by individual investor bias would be 
larger. 
Reverse Line Movements in In-Conference Games: 
 
 The results of these tests support my hypothesis of greater opportunity for profit 
by focusing on games with higher Square better participation. The Chi-Square statistic is 
approaching significance at the 10 percent level and returns are significant at the 5 
percent level before juice is considered. Over the past 12 years this strategy achieved an 
annual return of 22.2% assuming reduced juice. 
 Once juice is accounted for, the returns are not significantly different from 0 
percent at any conventional level using a two-tailed test. Returns when betting on a 
reduced juice book, however, are approaching statistical significance. 
Win % 53.0%
Sample Size 279
Chi-Square 0.52
Win % 53.2%
Sample Size 363
Chi-Square 0.73
Difference (Z-Score) -0.031
2003-2008
2009-2014
Pearson Chi-Square Return Significance Return Significance Return Significance
(No Juice) (Standard Juice) (Reduced Juice)
Win % 54.7% Sample Win % 53.8% Sample Win % 53.8% Sample Win % 53.8%
Expected Win % 50.0% Sample Push % 1.6% Sample Push % 1.6% Sample Push % 1.6%
Observations 481 Sample Lose % 44.6% Sample Lose % 44.6% Sample Lose % 44.6%
Observed Frequency 263 Winner Payout 1.00 Winner Payout 0.91 Winner Payout 0.95
Expected Frequency 240.5 Push Payout 0.00 Push Payout 0.00 Push Payout 0.00
Loser Payout -1.00 Loser Payout -1.00 Loser Payout -1.00
Expected Return 9.2% Expected Return 4.3% Expected Return 6.4%
Standard Deviation 98.9% Standard Deviation 94.4% Standard Deviation 96.4%
Observations 489 Observations 489 Observations 489
Standard Error 4.5% Standard Error 4.3% Standard Error 4.4%
Chi-Square 2.105 T Stat 2.059 T Stat 1.011 T Stat 1.464
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  Again, the win percentages achieved in the sub-periods 2003-2008 and 2009-2014 
do not differ from one another, indicating consistency in the strategy. 
Reverse Line Movements on Recent Poor Performers: 
 
 Focusing on reverse line movements involving teams that have performed poorly 
over their past two games proved to be the most successful strategy of the three over the 
past eleven seasons. There is no data from 2003 because no games during that season fit 
the strategy’s betting criteria. Winning percentage was significant at the 10 percent level 
and returns excluding juice were significant at the 2 percent level. Furthermore, this was 
the only test that exhibited statistically significant excess returns even when accounting 
for sports book commissions as returns assuming standard juice and reduced juice were 
significant at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. This betting strategy 
yielded a 55.9% annual return from 2004-2014. 
Win % 55.1%
Sample Size 216
Chi-Square 1.12
Win % 54.3%
Sample Size 265
Chi-Square 1.00
Difference (Z-Score) 0.165
2003-2008
2009-2014
Pearson Chi-Square Return Significance Return Significance Return Significance
(No Juice) (Standard Juice) (Reduced Juice)
Win % 60.7% Sample Win % 59.2% Sample Win % 59.2% Sample Win % 59.2%
Expected Win % 50.0% Sample Push % 2.4% Sample Push % 2.4% Sample Push % 2.4%
Observations 122 Sample Lose % 38.4% Sample Lose % 38.4% Sample Lose % 38.4%
Observed Frequency 74 Winner Payout 1.00 Winner Payout 0.91 Winner Payout 0.95
Expected Frequency 61 Push Payout 0.00 Push Payout 0.00 Push Payout 0.00
Loser Payout -1.00 Loser Payout -1.00 Loser Payout -1.00
Expected Return 20.8% Expected Return 15.4% Expected Return 17.9%
Standard Deviation 97.0% Standard Deviation 92.5% Standard Deviation 94.8%
Observations 125 Observations 125 Observations 125
Standard Error 8.7% Standard Error 8.3% Standard Error 8.5%
Chi-Square 2.770 T Stat 2.398 T Stat 1.863 T Stat 2.116
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 One problem with this strategy is that it appears to lack the same consistency as 
the previous two: 
 
 The z-score is not exceptionally high due to the relatively small sample sizes, but 
greater consistency would be desirable. To better understand where the inconsistency was 
coming from, I further divided the sample into three sub-periods (although this rendered 
the sample sizes very small): 
 
 These results clearly showed that the strategy exhibited considerable 
underperformance during the 2004-2006 NFL seasons. While the cause of this is unclear, 
it is possibly exaggerated by the very small sample size. With just one-fifth of the total 
observations coming from this sub-period, it is possible that the results are skewed. 
Furthermore, it is encouraging that the two most recent sub-periods have both exhibited 
exceptionally strong performance, achieving win rates of over 60 percent. The cause of 
the underperformance in the first sub-period is deserving of further research. 
Win % 56.5%
Sample Size 62
Chi-Square 0.52
Win % 65.0%
Sample Size 60
Chi-Square 2.70
Difference (Z-Score) -0.966
2004-2008
2009-2014
Win % 41.7%
Sample Size 24
Chi-Square 0.33
Win % 69.2%
Sample Size 52
Chi-Square 3.85
Win % 60.9%
Sample Size 46
Chi-Square 1.09
2004-2006
2011-2014
2007-2010
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IX. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 The findings in this paper suggest that uninformed participants in financial 
markets and the NFL betting market possess similar biases, and that these biases can be 
exploited by informed participants to generate positive excess returns. The ability of 
Sharp bettors to generate excess returns, much like professional investors, is well covered 
in academic research. This study adds to this literature by analyzing whether “Follower” 
bettors can imitate the bets of Sharps and achieve statistically significant excess returns 
and higher than expected winning percentages. 
 I found that the reverse line movement strategy is most effective when focused on 
games that are likely to exhibit higher levels of Square bettor bias. In-Conference games 
draw more attention from retail gamblers due to their playoff implications, much in the 
same way that individual investors are biased toward purchasing stocks covered 
extensively by the media. My results indicate that focusing on these games increases 
profitability, which indicates that spreads on these games are less efficient due to 
increased Square participation. 
 Betting on teams that had recently performed poorly and also experienced a 
reverse line movement proved to be the most profitable of the three strategies. The 
inspiration for this strategy was the theory of uninformed individual investors 
overreacting to recent news regarding a security, which renders contrarian investing 
strategies profitable. My findings indicate that a contrarian strategy in NFL betting can 
take advantage of a retail gambler bias to overreact to recent team performance. 
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 The downside of the reverse line movement strategy is that most of the 
inefficiencies have already been arbitraged away by Sharp gamblers. This is consistent 
with the first two strategies in this paper generating significant excess returns when 
ignoring commission costs, but falling below statistically significant levels once juice is 
accounted for. 
 It is true, however, that utilizing the reverse line movement strategy to bet on In-
Conference games or bet on recent poor performers approaches or exceeds statistically 
significant levels even after accounting for commissions. Levitt (2004) also found that 
“competitive pressure does not appear to eliminate excess profits” in the same way that 
one might expect given the ability of Sharp bettors to arbitrage. While I cannot provide 
direct evidence of why profits seem to remain achievable for Followers, I can suggest 
two possible explanations. The first is rather obvious in that sports book juice 
significantly inhibits arbitrage by informed bettors. Therefore, lines are able to stabilize at 
non-market clearing levels. This potentially allows for bettors on reduced juice sports 
books to squeeze out extra returns that other might not be able to. The more likely 
explanation is that sports books commonly impose bet size limits on Sharp gamblers in 
order to protect themselves. These limits are likely still above the average bet size of 
retail gamblers, but are low enough to inhibit the ability of Sharps to fully arbitrage the 
biased spreads. Further research in this area could be quite enlightening. 
 It is also important to note that the strategies which I have outlined in this paper 
could potentially be far more profitable than my findings indicate. In this paper I made 
the rather pessimistic assumption that Followers were placing all of their bets on the 
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closing line. In reality, there is nothing prohibiting Followers from placing bets as soon as 
they identify a reverse line movement during the course of the week leading up to the 
games. In theory, they could place the bets as soon as such a line movement occurs, 
thereby securing a more favorable line before the arbitrage can fully occur. In fact, this 
concept is commonly used in practice and is referred to by bettors as “chasing steam.” 
Many gamblers regularly practice this strategy, but I never came across the topic in an 
academic paper during my research. Parallels could likely be drawn between chasing 
steam and high frequency traders front running institutional investors in financial 
markets. Academic testing of this strategy is warranted. 
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XI. FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1: Percent of Bets Placed on Favorites 
Sample: 12 years of public betting percentages on NFL games. Data from Sports Insights. 
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Figure 2: Super Bowl Betting Amounts 
Sample: 10 years of legal Super Bowl betting amounts. Data from the Nevada Gaming 
Control Board. 
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Figure 3: Las Vegas Sports Books Super Bowl Profits 
Sample: 10 years Las Vegas sports books profits as a percentage of total money wagered on 
the Super Bowl. Data from the Nevada Gaming Control Board. 
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Table 1: Example of Data Structure 
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